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Abstract
Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize
the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements.
Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in
adjustment should fade away with experience. If this finding proves to be robust,
inertia in adjustment may be irrelevant among experienced agents. The conjecture in
the literature is that inertia would still persist, perhaps indefinitely, in the presence
of real-world complications such as nonidentical shocks. Herein, we empirically test
the conjecture that the inertia in adjustment is more persistent if the shocks are
nonidentical. For both identical and nonidentical shocks, we find persistent inertia and
similar patterns of adjustment that can be explained by backward-looking expectation
rules. Notably, refining these rules with similarity-based learning approach improves
their predictive power.
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1 Introduction
How long would it take for market outcomes to fully adjust to the new equilibrium level
in response to an exogenous shock? In a seminal paper on the rational expectations (RE)
hypothesis, Muth (1961) demonstrates that convergence to equilibrium is instantaneous in
a frictionless economy if the errors in agents’ expectations are not highly correlated as they
cancel out at the aggregate level. However, the empirical evidence points to systematic errors
due to heuristic-based reasoning under which the aggregate outcomes may exhibit substantial
inertia. Whether and how the adjustment would be delayed in the presence of nonrational
expectations is a key question for policy-makers – central banks that aim at engineering
structural changes – and for actors in markets where equilibrium is frequently shifting due
to shocks. If adjustment is sluggish and shocks occur frequently, aggregates may rarely be in
accordance with the equilibrium path predictions generated by the impulse-response analyses
of RE-based models.
Early experimental evidence from double auctions shows that equilibrium prices emerge
within a few periods (Smith, 1962). Convergence occurs even in the presence of zero-intelligence
computer traders who submit random bids and asks if these bids are constrained with a
budget (Gode and Sunder, 1993). Nonetheless, persistent deviations from equilibrium are
reported in different types of competitive markets (e.g., asset market experiments, AMEs
henceforth, Smith et al. 1988). Thus, the extent to which limited rationality influences
market outcomes depends on the characteristics of the market.
The type of strategic environment governing the market is one of the key characteristics
determining the impact of limited rationality on behavior and outcomes. Following the
theoretical work of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989), Fehr and Tyran (2005, 2008)
experimentally test the role of the strategic environment on the adjustment dynamics after a
monetary shock. In accordance with the theoretical predictions, the adjustment is immediate
when actions are strategic substitutes, and gradual when actions are strategic complements.
The role of the strategic environment has been further experimentally investigated in Learning-to-Forecast
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Experiments (LtFEs, Heemeijer et al. 2009, Bao et al. 2012), guessing games (Sutan and
Willinger 2009, Cooper et al. 2017, Hanaki et al. 2019) and duopoly games (Potters and
Suetens, 2009).1 The main pattern emerging from these studies is that deviations from
equilibrium tend to be larger and more persistent under strategic complementarity as compared
to strategic substitutability.2
Herein, we focus on strategic complementarity which comes as an important feature of
various economic contexts including macroeconomic coordination, bank runs, and oligopoly
competition.3 As argued by Hommes (2006), strategic complementarity is crucial for modeling
asset markets characterized by a positive feedback mechanism between expectations on asset
prices and the realizations of these prices.
The literature still lacks consensus on how repeated shocks (whether they are identical or
not) could affect adjustment under strategic complementarity. On the one hand, the initial
deviations from RE may subsequently disappear due to experience effects, as commonly
reported in AMEs (e.g., Smith et al. 1988). In a recent study, Cooper et al. (2017) show that
these results can be extended to guessing games. They introduce three identical shocks
into Nash equilibrium (NE) in a periodic manner and report slight acceleration in the
adjustment speed over shocks. On the other hand, experimental studies based on AMEs
and LtFEs question the robustness of experience effects (Kopa´nyi-Peuker and Weber 2018;
Shestakova et al. 2019). Hussam et al. (2008) argue that experience effects critically rely on
the stationarity of the environment. Accordingly, both Cooper et al. (2017, p. 207) and Fehr
and Tyran (2008, p. 387) conjecture that in case of repeated nonidentical shocks, the impact
of nonrational expectations would persist. However, neither paper provides an empirical test
of this conjecture. Our work aims at filling this gap.
We experimentally test the conjecture of a relative persistence of nonidentical shocks in a
guessing game with strategic complementarity (based on Cooper et al., 2017). We introduce
1See Hommes (2011) and Arifovic and Duffy (2018) for an overview of the Learning-to-Forecast literature.
2Hanaki et al. (2019) are the first to term this phenomenon as the strategic environment effect.
3See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for more examples.
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large periodic shocks to the NE and compare adjustment dynamics between two experimental
conditions: one where shocks are identical and another where they are not. During the first
and last post-shock phases, the NE are the same in both conditions. Through this design,
we are able to measure the treatment effect of experiencing nonidentical shocks (i) on the
aggregate adjustment speed, and (ii) on the way individuals form expectations. Related
to (i), we find that post-shock adjustment accelerates due to repetition. Compared to the
initial post-shock adjustment, it takes fewer periods for the adjustment to occur after further
shocks. However, we fail to identify a significant effect of nonidentical shocks on the pace of
adjustment. Related to (ii), our results show that experience may not be enough to deplete
na¨ıvety, at least not within four repetitions of the game.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. Firstly, we document the robustness of
the findings of Cooper et al. (2017) in the context of identical shocks, and further extend
their findings to a more complex environment with nonidentical shocks. In this context,
we find that the inertia in adjustment is a robust feature of markets governed by strategic
complementarity and that it does not depend on the stationarity of periodic shocks. Secondly,
the data on expectations across subjects and over time allow us to study the individual
underpinnings of the observed aggregate dynamics. To avoid arbitrariness in model selection,
we consider a wide range of backward-looking expectation rules and take their predictions
to the experimental data. This novel horse race exercise reveals that upgrading expectation
rules with similarity-based learning approach improves their predictive power under identical
shocks. Notably, the best performing model is a simple nonparametric reformulation of
na¨ıve expectations with similarity-based learning (first proposed by Cooper et al., 2017).
We discuss its behavioral foundations and relate it to the previous literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our research
hypotheses. Section 3 presents our methodology: the guessing game and the way we
implement it in the lab. Section 4 summarizes the main results which are then discussed
in Section 5. Lastly, Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings, as well as the
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implications and limitations of the study.
2 Related Literature and Hypotheses
Table 1 - Convergence in the previous experiments
Study Type of Shock size Convergence
environment (in %) period
Fehr and Tyran (2001)1 Pricing decision -67% & +100% 13 & 4
Fehr and Tyran (2008)2 Pricing decision -50% 9
Davis and Korenok (2011)3 Monopolistic competition +100% 21
Petersen and Winn (2014)1 Pricing decision -67% & +92% 8 & 4
Cooper et al. (2017)4 Guessing game -77% 8
1 Shock as the change in average equilibrium price in the nominal treatment with human opponents.
2 Shock as the change in average equilibrium price in nominal treatment.
3 Shock as the change in monopolistically competitive prices in the BASE/PUB treatment. Prices
remain significantly different than competitive level in the first reported 20 post-shock periods.
4 Shock as the change in the NE guess in first round.
Table 1 summarizes the evidence from experimental studies that investigate the dynamics
of convergence following large shocks when actions are strategic complements. Here, the
“Convergence period” reported in column 4 indicates the number of periods for the general
activity level (price, forecast, guess, etc.) to become statistically indistinguishable (at the
5% level) from the post-shock theoretical equilibrium value.4 The general pattern in those
data is that convergence takes time when actions are strategic complements. In particular,
adjustment to the NE tends to be slow after the initial shock, even though acceleration may
still occur when markets are repeated (Cooper et al., 2017).5 We expect to observe the same
pattern in a slightly modified environment.6
Hypothesis 1. When shocks are identical, adjustment to the NE is slow and gradual after
the initial shock, but accelerates over repetition of the same market.
4We retrieved the information about the convergence period directly from each article. Thus, the table
does not account for the differences in experimental designs and statistical methods used across these studies.
5This is also a standard finding across AMEs. For instance, Smith et al. (1988), Dufwenberg et al. (2005)
and Haruvy et al. (2007) show that repeating market interactions three times eliminates bubbles.
6The scope of these modifications along with their rationale are described in Section 3.2.
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Albeit robust in stationary environments, experience effects are argued to be sensitive
to the complexity of the environment. For instance, in the AME and LtFE studies by
Kopa´nyi-Peuker and Weber (2018) and Hussam et al. (2008), bubbles do not disappear
despite repetition.7 Hussam et al. (2008) also report that bubbles reignite even with twice-experienced
subjects following drastic changes in the environment (e.g., the amount of liquidity in
the market). Moreover, Cooper et al. (2017) and Fehr and Tyran (2008) conjecture that
nonidentical shocks may thwart experience effects which constitutes the basis of our second
hypothesis.8
Hypothesis 2. The adjustment accelerates with market repetition at a slower pace in the
presence of nonidentical shocks than with identical shocks.
We now turn to the possible explanations of adjustment dynamics. Several studies provide
a descriptive explanation of the observed inertia based on nonrational expectations. Yet,
they strongly diverge in terms of the best fitting model. For instance, Fehr and Tyran
(2008) report that their data are best organized by a model in which all agents exhibit na¨ıve
expectations.9 Cooper et al. (2017), in turn, obtain the best fit with heterogenous groups:
one rational player and three nonrational players whose expectations follow a version of na¨ıve
expectations rule adapted to a repeated shocks design. Other studies point to trend-following
expectations (Haruvy et al. 2007) or even RE (Marquardt et al. 2019) as best describing their
experimental evidence.
We note, however, that the aformentioned studies either do not compare the fit of their
model with other expectation rules, or only consider a relatively narrow set of competing
rules.10 More systematic comparisons exist in the LtFE literature. The design of LtFEs
7According to Kopa´nyi-Peuker and Weber (2018), a possible explanation is that this occurs because
interactions in their experiment have an indefinite horizon.
8Bao et al. (2012) study large nonidentical shocks in LtFEs by introducing two large shocks to the
rational expectations (RE) equilibrium. However, their design does not propose a way to test the effect of
nonidentical shocks with respect to identical ones. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to
directly test the impact of the heterogeneity of shocks in a controlled environment.
9In their model of fully adaptive expectations, players expect the outcome of the last period to reoccur.
10For instance, Marquardt et al. (2019) only consider three models: myopic, trend and RE. Moreover,
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is particularly well-suited for investigating expectations since the experimental task is to
forecast the prices one-period-ahead. Trend-following has been repeatedly shown to outperform
all the others under homogeneous expectations (Bao et al. 2012; Anufriev et al. 2013;
Heemeijer et al. 2009). Pfajfar and Zˇakelj (2014) estimate the share of RE and simple
expectations in their New Keynesian LtFEs. They arrive to the conclusion that the RE
(simple rules) cannot be rejected for 30-45% (35-50%) of subjects. This finding has been
subsequently confirmed by Marquardt et al. (2019). In the context of the evolutionary
heuristic switching model (HSM, Anufriev and Hommes 2012), Cornea-Madeira et al. (2019)
estimate the weights of na¨ıve and fundamentalist rules in inflation expectations in the U.S.
inflation data spanning from 1968:Q4 to 2015:Q2. Despite a substantial time variation, they
find that 65% of individuals form na¨ıve expectations, the share of which increases in reaction
to large inflationary shocks, thus creating self-fulfilling inflation persistence.
Based on this body of empirical literature, we conclude the following. First, the best
fitting expectation models vary across different experimental settings. Second, for the
experimental settings closest to ours (i.e., guessing games and LtFEs) simple backward-looking
expectation models outperform RE. This observation leads us to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Backward-looking expectation rules in form of heuristics fit the data better
than RE.
Finally, we provide the first out-of-the-sample test of the relative performance of the
expectation rule proposed by Cooper et al. (2017). This rule seems promising in the
context of repeated shocks since it echoes the similarity-based learning approach (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1995; Plonsky et al., 2015). Accordingly, a player expects the outcome of
the last period to reoccur in stable phases. After observing a shock, the player reviews all the
past periods and expects the outcome of the period following the previous occurence of the
same shock. We denote this rule as similarity-based na¨ıve expectations (SBNE). In the same
the parameters of their trend model resemble what other studies denote as strong trend-following rule (e.g.,
Anufriev and Hommes 2012). In Section 5, we discuss why strong trend-following may not be a suitable rule
for environments like AMEs.
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vein, we extend the adaptive and trend-following models and denote them respectively as
similarity-based adaptive expectations (SBAE) and similarity-based trend-following expectations
(SBTF). We conjecture that this class of rules best explains behavior under repeated identical
shock.
Hypothesis 4. Under identical shocks, the rules that are augmented with the similarity-based
learning approach provide the best fit to the experimental data.
3 Method
3.1 Guessing Game under Strategic Complementarity
To investigate whether repeating identical shocks improves the speed of adjustment, and
whether nonidentical shocks slow down this process, we refer to a repeated guessing game
under strategic complementarity that is adapted from Nagel (1995). Our experimental game
also resembles those used in LtFEs with positive feedback. The fundamental difference
between these two designs is that while guessing games provide full information on the game
structure (including the parameters), LtFEs provide only qualitative information about the
market structure. Nevertheless, Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2010) show that convergence
dynamics are similar when the feedback parameters are equal.11
In each period t ∈ [1, T ], a group of N players simultaneously choose a number (rounded
up to two decimals) from the closed set pi,t ∈ [0, 100], where i = 1, . . . , N . Each player i has
a target number yi,t that is calculated as
yi,t = bp¯−i,t + a+ ξt, (1)
where p¯−i,t is the average number chosen by the remaining players12 at period t, a and b are
11See Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2010) for a detailed comparison of guessing games and LtFEs.
12Sutan and Willinger (2009) report that the inclusion of own guesses causes a significant amount of
confusion among subjects. Therefore, we opted for excluding player’s own guess from the target formula.
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positive constant numbers with b ∈ (0, 1), and ξt is a deterministic large shock which takes
the values
ξt =

0, if t ≤ T/2
ξ¯, if t > T/2.
(2)
The constant term b generates strategic complementarity among the players’ actions.
The player with the smallest guessing error | yi,t − pi,t | wins the fixed stage game payoff F .
In case of a tie, the payoff is equally split among the winners.
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium which corresponds to an interior solution:
pNEt =
a+ξt
(1−b) .
13 Here, pNEt is invariant for the first T/2 periods, called the pre-shock periods.
The shock ξ¯ shifts the equilibrium downwards at period T/2 + 1. These remaining periods
with a new equilibrium are the post-shock periods. In addition, shocks are repeated: a
sequence of T periods (pre- and post-shock) is repeated over R rounds.
3.2 Experimental Design
Our experimental manipulation consists in varying the value of ξ¯r over rounds. For
identical shocks (baseline), ξ¯r = ξ¯ for all r ∈ [1, R]. For nonidentical shocks (treatment), the
size of the shock varies across rounds. Importantly, the equilibrium solution outlined above
applies to both cases, so that players are always incentivized to play the NE.
The calibration of the experimental game is summarized in Table 2. A group of 5
participants play the guessing game for 4 rounds, and each round is composed of 16 periods.
This yields a total of 64 guessing decisions per player. In period 9 of each round, a negative
shock ξ¯ shifts parameter a from 15 to a value that depends on the experimental condition.
In baseline, shocks are identical and the shock component equals −9 in every rounds.
In treatment, shocks are not identical and the shock component is characterized by the
13The proof is based on the iterated elimination of dominated strategies. See Nagel (1995) for details.
This equilibrium is also a RE equilibrium. Bray (1983) shows that when b < 1, a misspecified expectation
rule – ordinary least-squares learning – almost surely converges to the RE equilibrium. However, she also
emphasizes that this does not imply unbiased expectations. As she notes (Bray 1982, pp. 330), “[r]ational
expectations are, if anything, a long run rather than a short run phenomenon.”
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sequence (−9,−6,−12,−9) in rounds (1, 2, 3, 4). Thus, the post-shock NE is the same in the
first and last rounds in both conditions. This allows us to capture the effect of experiencing
nonidentical shocks by comparing adjustment speeds in round 4.
Table 2 - Experimental design parameters
General parameters
Number of periods per round T = 16
Number of rounds per session R = 4
Group size N = 5
Stage game prize F = 4.40 euros
The slope of target formula b = 0.75
Pre-shock value of constant a = 15
Pre-shock equilibrium pNEpre = 60
Post-shock equilibrum (pNEpost) Baseline Treatment
Round 1 24 24
Round 2 24 36
Round 3 24 12
Round 4 24 24
The design of this experiment closely follows Cooper et al. (2017), with some noteworthy
modifications. First, in their study, groups are composed of 4 players. Following Hanaki
et al. (2019), we increase the number of players to 5 per group.14 Second, in Cooper
et al. (2017) there are three rounds of 20 periods. We decrease the length of each round
to 16 periods to be able to add one additional round without extending the duration of
the experiment excessively. Third, since post-shock phases are shorter in our study, the
post-shock equilibrium in baseline groups is set at a higher level. Finally, Cooper et al.
(2017) elicit expectations of subjects in addition to their guesses while we elicit expectations
jointly with the guesses which comes as a remedy against potential inconsistencies.15
14They show that the effect of strategic environment is statistically significant for groups of five or more
agents.
15The elicitation method is explained in Section 3.3. Ex ante, the design of our baseline condition provides
more suitable circumstances to observe rapid adjustment than the one in Cooper et al. (2017), since we have
an extra round and a belief elicitation mechanism that emphasizes best replying to one’s expectations.
However, the data suggest that the patterns of adjustment are similar in both experiments.
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We implement a fixed matching protocol within each round, and a random rematching
protocol between rounds. To reduce the scope of session effects due to random rematching,
in each session we divide each group of twenty participants into two equal and permanent
rematching clusters. Random rematching only occurs within a rematching cluster which
makes observations potentially correlated within a cluster, but strictly independent between
clusters.
3.3 Procedures
Experimental sessions were conducted at the GATE-Lab in Lyon by using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).16 120 participants were recruited for 6 sessions in October 2019. Each session has
20 subjects recruited through a between-subjects design and divided into two separate
rematching clusters of ten players.17 This yields six independent clusters of observations
per condition, and twelve clusters in total.
Subjects are provided with the instructions of the game in paper form that are read
aloud by the experimenter.18 These instructions specify all the rules of the game except the
values of shocks. Participants are informed that this value will be displayed on the decision
screen, may be subject to variation during the experiment, and that in a given period it
remains the same for everyone. Once the instructions are read, subjects are asked to answer
nine comprehension questions displayed on their screens. They are also informed about the
correct answers with brief explanations.
In the main part of the experiment, each participant makes a series of 64 guessing
decisions. Each time, subjects first see a decision screen where they enter their guesses.
16The experimental procedures have been approved by the GATE-Lab Review Board.
17See Appendix A for the experimental materials and Appendix B for a description of the subject pool.
18Before reading the instructions and playing the game, subjects solve a series of questionnaires which
contain cognitive reflection test (CRT, Frederick 2005), reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET,
Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), a short-term memory test (STM) adapted from Wechsler digit span test and
seven questions designed to measure subjects’ propensity to reason in a heuristic manner. We use these
scores to test the sensitivity of our findings with respect to several individual characteristics. This analysis is
reported in Appendix C.2. The content and the measurement method of each test are provided in Appendices
A.4 and A.6.
11
For a given guess, the computer automatically provides the corresponding expectation of the
average guess of others in their group. After seeing these expectations, subjects can either
revise or confirm their guesses.19 After each decision screen, subjects pass to the feedback
screen where they receive feedback on the realized target number and their own payoffs.
To smoothen the game, in each period the decision screen has a nonbinding timer set to
60 seconds (except for the initial period of the game which has 120 seconds).20 Both screens
also display the ongoing period and round, and provide a summary of the previous outcomes:
a figure representing the time series of previous guesses and realized target numbers as well
as a historical period-by-period table containing own expectations and the actual average
guesses of others, as well as own stage game payoffs. To minimize any potential wealth or
end-game effects, the final payoff correponds to the payoffs accumulated in all periods of
a randomly chosen round of the game. At the end, subjects also reply to a demographic
questionnaire.
An experimental session took 150 minutes on average. Subjects were paid 7 euros for
their participation and 14.08 euros on average for the experimental game.
4 Results
First, we analyze the group-level deviations from the NE and measure the adjustment
speed across rounds and experimental conditions. We rely on the statistical framework
previously adopted by Cooper et al. (2017). Second, we investigate the within-period
variation of individual guesses across experimental conditions. Lastly, we compare the
descriptive power of various expectation models by their one-period-ahead forecast accuracy,
19This method provides a consistent way for joint elicitation of guesses and expectations. Some of the
previous studies document systematic inconsistencies between expectations and decisions that are elicited
separately (Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker, 2008). Moreover, LtFEs and AMEs studies show that having
both forecasting and optimizing tasks may be detrimental to learning and cause mispricing (Bao et al., 2013;
Hanaki et al., 2018).
20Kocher and Sutter (2006) show that average decision time in the first period of guessing games is around
50 seconds and decreases gradually until the range 10-15 seconds after 20 periods. Thus, this feature of our
design should not put participants under excessive time pressure.
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as measured through the root-mean-squared-error (RMSE). We also evaluate the changes in
performance of models across rounds by computing their impact factors in an evolutionary
learning model – the heuristic switching model (HSM). This allows us to investigate whether
the observed acceleration is due to an increase in the share of subjects forming RE, or rather
due to the adaptive dynamics of simple expectation rules.
4.1 Adjustment Dynamics
Figure 1: Dotted lines represent NE. In each round, a dot (triangle) corresponds to the median value of
the average group guesses in the baseline (treatment) condition.
We first turn to the aggregate outcomes and look at the evolution of the average group
guesses over time. Figure 1 summarizes the observed median values of average group guesses
(with 12 groups per experimental condition) across rounds and periods. As expected, round
1 – in which the environment remains strictly identical in both experimental conditions
– generates the same patterns in the data in baseline and treatment. In particular, in
the pre-shock phase of round 1 this median never fully converges to the NE level.21 The
second salient observation is that the convergence to the NE systematically exhibits a convex
pattern, but happens at varying speed.22
21We note that Cooper et al. (2017) observe the same pattern of adjustment under identical shocks.
22The evolution of guesses in the pre-shock periods of rounds 3 and 4 also suggests that the path of shocks
experienced in the past does not affect per se the adjustment to the NE. Despite the different sizes of shocks
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Table 3 - Post-shock deviations from NE
Post-shock Baseline Treatment
periods Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 1 Round 4
1 22.76*** 22.08*** 19.31*** 18.38*** 24.89*** 20.86***
2 17.88*** 16.13*** 13.19*** 9.46*** 17.95*** 12.32***
3 13.93*** 10.13*** 8.38*** 4.57*** 13.15*** 5.70***
4 7.39*** 6.38*** 4.66*** 1.51*** 9.32*** 1.64*
5 5.22** 3.02*** 2.38*** -0.22 6.67** 0.17
6 1.64 1.14 0.99 -0.54 3.50 -0.82
7 3.40 1.26 0.37 -0.44* 3.98 -0.80*
8 2.65 0.74 0.15 -0.38 3.18 -0.42
Note. Coefficients at and intercept term a0 (in italics) from a median quantile regression model
specified in (3). Standard errors are clustered at rematching cluster level (6 clusters per condition)
and bootstrapped with 1999 replications. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1%
level, respectively.
For a formal statistical comparison of the patterns of convergence in both experimental
conditions, we use median quantile regression to estimate the following model:23
p¯g,t − pNEt = a0 + at1[Period = t] + g,t, (3)
where the dependent variable is the difference between the average group guess (p¯g,t) and the
NE guess (pNE) in a given period t, while the independent variables are 63 period indicators
(1[Period = t] equals 1 for period t, and 0 otherwise). The coefficient of the final period
is dropped to avoid linear dependencies.24 We run this regression separately for baseline
and treatment. Table 3 reports a subset of the estimated coefficients corresponding to the
post-shock periods in all four rounds of the baseline and in rounds 1 and 4 of the treatment
(in which the NE is the same as in the baseline).
This model allows us to analyze the patterns of adjustment to the NE in two steps.
First, the intercept a0 provides an empirical benchmark for convergence, i.e. the ability to
in round 2 between baseline and treatment, the adjustment to the NE in the pre-shock phase of the following
round is identical in both conditions. The same holds for the adjustment to the NE in the pre-shock phase
in round 4.
23This approach closely follows Cooper et al. (2017) and minimizes the role of potential outliers.
24The estimated standard errors are based on clustering with bootstrap resampling to take into account
the possible correlation between guesses within a rematching cluster. The number of bootstrap samples
follows Davidson and MacKinnon (2000).
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adjust guesses to the NE play as measured by the degree of convergence to the NE that can
be reached after 63 periods and with a full scope of experience accumulation and learning
(that we further investigate in Section 4.2) in the experimental game. Testing whether this
empirical benchmark differs from the formal prediction based on the NE (H0 : p¯64−pNE64 = 0)
boils down to testing for the statistical significance of a0. For both baseline and treatment,
the estimated values of a0 are similar and very close to zero (-0.38 and -0.42, respectively);
in neither case we reject their nullity (p = 0.133 and p = 0.285, respectively). Second, we
build on this first step and define the speed of adjustment as the earliest period in which the
outcome attains (in statistical terms) our empirical benchmark of convergence. This period
(denoted tc) indicates the point of reaching the adjustment benchmark: for each period t ≥ tc
of a given phase we fail to reject H0 : at = 0.
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In accordance with Hypothesis 1, we observe gradual adjustment in the first round
of both baseline and treatment conditions. Adjustment accelerates across rounds, but
this acceleration is not necessarily monotonic. The adjustment periods tc are respectively
{6, 6, 6, 5} in baseline and {6, 4} in the first and the last rounds of treatment when a 5%
significance level is considered. Initial deviations remain high in each post-shock phase,
indicating that experience does not prevent deviations despite repetition over four rounds.
Result 1a: In both experimental conditions, after the initial shock guesses gradually
adjust to the post-shock NE in a convex manner.
Result 1b: In both experimental conditions, adjustment occurs earlier in response to
the last shock (round 4) compared to the initial shock (round 1).
Notwithstanding our Hypothesis 2, these results indicate that the number of periods
required for adjustment in round 4 is similar in both conditions. We also propose another
way to test (and eventually reject) Hypothesis 2. First, we investigate the within-period
variation of guesses between the two conditions. We estimate the following median quantile
25This definition echoes the definition of convergence proposed by Hyndman et al. (2012).
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regression model separately for each of the eight post-shock periods of round 4:
pi = b0 + b11[Treatment] + i, (4)
where the independent variable 1[Treatment] = 1 for observations coming from the treatment
sessions (and 0 otherwise), and the dependent variable is the individual guess (N = 120 per
regression). Like before, we employ bootstrapped standard errors clustered at rematching
cluster level (999 replications). The coefficients b1 (reported in Table 4) remain insignificant
in each of the eight models, suggesting that the evolution of guesses over time (and thus
their gradual adjustment to the NE) in the final periods is statistically indistinguishable in
both conditions. Figure 2 provides a visual representation of this pattern.
Table 4 - The effect of heterogeneity in shocks on guesses of last post-shock phase
Periods 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
b0 39.70*** 32.89*** 28.40*** 25.10*** 23.49*** 23.07*** 23.21*** 23.60***
(1.54) (1.08) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44) (0.31) (0.11) (0.11)
b1 4.60* 3.21 1.35 -0.10 0.15 -0.67 -0.41 -0.35
(2.70) (2.02) (1.19) (0.94) (1.09) (0.79) (0.88) (0.71)
Coefficients from median quantile regression models specified in (4). Each coefficient comes from one regression
(N = 120 per regression). Below coefficients standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at the rematching cluster level (6 clusters per condition) and bootstrapped with 999 replications. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively.
Result 2: As compared to identical shocks, nonidentical shocks do not cause a significant
slow down in adjustment.
4.2 Expectation Formation
In this section, we exploit the data on expectations retrieved from (and consistent with)
the guesses, as previously explained in Section 3.3. We consider a set of expectation rules
to provide a descriptive explanation for the observed aggregate results.26 These rules,
26Note that by taking the conditional expectation on both sides, equation (1) can be rewritten as pi,t =
Ei,t−1[pi,t] = (a + ξt) + bEhi,t−1[p−i,t]. Thus, subjects choose their guesses pi,t as best response to their
16
Figure 2: Median individual guess by experimental conditions for periods 55-64. Dots represent the NE.
Circles (triangles) represent guesses in baseline (treatment) condition. Whiskers denote standard deviations.
Unit of observation is the individual guesses.
summarized in Table 5, are mainly derived from two classes of learning models: adaptive
(rules 1 to 6) and extrapolative (rules 7 to 13). Under the data generation process described in
equation (1), the adaptive learning can be represented in a recursive form with the following
formula:
pei,t = p
e
i,t−1 + w(p−i,t−1 − pei,t−1), (5)
where a player expects the weighted average of the most recent outcome and his/her own
previous expectation. In the extrapolative expectations, a player tracks the most recent
change in the realized outcome in the following manner:
pei,t = p−i,t−1 + γ(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2). (6)
The coefficients w and γ are learning parameters. We predetermine these parameters
based on their computational ease as an attempt to imitate different kinds of boundedly
one-period-ahead expectation about the average guess of other players in the group that is Ehi,t−1[p−i,t]. The
superscript h is placed to indicate that the process of expectation formation is more general than RE and
may be based on any rule h. For the sake of simplicity, throughout the paper we use the notation pei,t instead
of Ehi,t−1[p−i,t].
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rational reasoning. We also include two models (rules 6 and 13) where parameters w and γ
are estimated from the individual expectations data with fixed effects regressions and one
equilibrium model (rule 14) where a player’s expectation corresponds to the NE.27
The next three rules (15 to 17) reformulate rules 1, 3 and 9 (respectively) with similarity-based
learning. Under rule 15, for instance, a player expects the outcome of last period to reoccur
as in the case of na¨ıve expectations if the parameters in the target formula did not change
(i.e., if there were no shock). Once the target formula has changed, the player reviews all
the past periods and the new expectation now coincides with the outcome of the most recent
period involving an analogous change t −m, such that ∆ξt = ∆ξt−m where m refers to the
distance between current period and its most recent analogue from the past. If there is no
such analogue, the player simply expects the outcome of the previous period. Rules 16 and
17 apply the same logic to adaptive (v1.) and weak trend-following rules.28
These rules have been selected for two main reasons. First, they are commonplace in the
literature (see Section 2).29 Second, they are based on backward-looking heuristics (with the
exception of the fitted rules and rule 14), so that their functional forms are easy to compute
(e.g., rule 1). Finally, we have excluded level-k type of expectations in the vein of the rule
learning model of Stahl (1996) and the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004),
since there is no common prior through which level-0 type can form imitation after the first
period.30
27Note that fundamentalism is not equivalent to RE since it ignores the fact that other players might be
nonrational. For these two to be equivalent, one needs to assume homogeneous expectations and common
knowledge of rationality.
28For the sake of illustration, suppose that a subject uses rule 17. In period 25 of the baseline game,
s/he should extrapolate the change between periods 8 and 9 rather than between 23 and 24 (as it would the
case in normal trend rule). Following this logic, the similarity-based reformulation changes expectations in
periods 25, 33, 41, 49, 57 for identical shocks, and for period 57 for the nonidentical ones.
29Note that the nomenclature used to describe these rules may vary across fields. For instance, our rule
1 is equivalent to Cournot play in standard game theory and to the random-walk-believing in finance.
30Alternatively, we could assume that level-0 type always selects randomly; however, this would be
unreasonable when imitation dynamics and evolution over time are considered.
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Table 5 - Description of selected expectation rules for comparison
No Description Functional form
1 Na¨ıve exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1
2 Obstinacy pei,t = p
e
i,t−1
3 Adaptive exp. v1. pei,t = 0.75p−i,t−1 + 0.25p
e
i,t−1
4 Adaptive exp. v2. pei,t = 0.50p−i,t−1 + 0.50p
e
i,t−1
5 Adaptive exp. v3. pei,t = 0.25p−i,t−1 + 0.75p
e
i,t−1
6 Fitted adaptive exp. pei,t = 0.89p−i,t−1 + 0.11p
e
i,t−1
7 Strong trend-following exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 + 0.75(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
8 Medium trend-following exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 + 0.50(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
9 Weak trend-following exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 + 0.25(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
10 Strong contrarian exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 − 0.75(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
11 Medium contrarian exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 − 0.50(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
12 Weak contrarian exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 − 0.25(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
13 Fitted extrapolative exp. pei,t = p−i,t−1 + 0.08(p−i,t−1 − p−i,t−2)
14 Fundamentalist pei,t = p
NE
t
15 SBNE pei,t =
{
p−i,t−1, if ξt = ξt−1
p−i,t−m, if ξt 6= ξt−1
16 SBAE pei,t =
{
0.75p−i,t−1 + 0.25pei,t−1, if ξt = ξt−1
0.75p−i,t−m + 0.25pei,t−m, if ξt 6= ξt−1
17 SBTF pei,t =
{
p−i,t−1 + 0.25∆p−i,t−1, if ξt = ξt−1
p−i,t−m + 0.25∆p−i,t−m, if ξt 6= ξt−1
Note: Each description provides a rule for how players expect the average guess of other players
one-period-ahead.
The goodness of fit of a given rule to the experimental data is based on the aggregate
one-period-ahead forecast error that is computed as the root mean squared error (RMSE):
RMSE(pht ) =
√∑64
t=3
∑G
g=1(p
h
g,t − peg,t)2
62×G , (7)
where phg,t is the prediction of rule h ∈ {1, ..., 17} for the average expectation of group g
in period t and peg,t is the actual average expectation of group g in period t. Here, the
superscript G is the scale of RMSE. A lower value of RMSE points to a better fit. We
measure the RMSE in three different ways: at the rematching cluster level (G = 2), for each
experimental condition (G = 12), and for the pooled data (G = 24). We exclude the data
from the first two periods since certain rules require at least two past observations.
19
Panel A of Table 6 reports the RMSE for each of the seventeen rules. For baseline as well
as pooled data, SBNE (rule 15) achieves the best fit. For the treatment data, is it slightly
outperformed by SBTF (rule 17). In line with Hypothesis 4, the rules that are augmented
with similarity-based learning (rules 15 to 17) yield a better fit than the remaining ones,
with RMSE two times smaller than under the worst performing fundamentalist rule. The
last line in Panel C shows how much switching to similarity-based learning improves the fits.
As can be seen, the improvements emerge in the baseline condition in which identical shocks
reoccur in a periodic manner. In the treatment condition, only the first and the last shocks
are identical which leaves less space for applying similarity-based reasoning.31 At the cluster
level, the rules that are augmented with similarity-based reasoning provide the best fit for
most (10 out of 12) rematching clusters. The data from the baseline (treatment) rematching
clusters are best organized by the rules that are derived from adaptive (extrapolative)
learning. Lastly, in line with Hypothesis 3, fundamentalism (rule 14) is always the worst
fitting model regardless of the data aggregation level.
Result 3: Backward-looking expectation rules describe the expectations better than the
RE.
Result 4a: Reformulating the rules with similarity-based reasoning improves their fit to
the data, especially when shocks are identical.
Result 4b: Overall, the SBNE rule has the best fit among all homogeneous expectation
rules.
Note that these comparisons rely on the central assumption that all players refer to the
same expectation rule (i.e., under the homogeneity of expectations). There is, however, a
wide range of evidence indicating heterogeneity in expectations (Hommes, 2011). Moreover,
expectation rules may vary not only across individuals, but also over time: a given rule may
at first perform poorly, but later on become more relevant due to the experience. For this
31This is most starkly observable when we compare the improvements in RMSE from refining rules with
similarity-based learning for period 57, i.e. the first post-shock period in round 4. More details are provided
in Table B2 in Appendix B that reports the changes in fits in the initial post-shock periods.
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reason, we first refer to an evolutionary model of expectations: the HSM of Anufriev and
Hommes (2012).32 According to the HSM, agents choose the expectation rule from a set of
heuristics, evaluate the performance of each heuristic over time and switch to the heuristic
that performs best in terms of the forecasting error. Accordingly, the one-period-ahead
expectation of the HSM for group g is
pHSMt+1 =
H∑
h=1
nh,tp
h
t+1, (8)
where nh,t is the impact factor of heuristic h at period t. This impact factor can be interpreted
as the weights attributed by agents to different heuristics. The impact factor depends on
the performance of the heuristic measured with the current and past squared forecast errors
Uh,t = −(p¯−i,t − pht )2 + ηUh,t−1, (9)
where η ∈ [0, 1] is a free parameter representing the weight assigned to the past performance
compared to current. η = 0 implies that only the performance in the most recent period
matters. The impact of heuristic is updated through a discrete choice model with asynchronous
updating described by
nh,t = δnh,t−1 + (1− δ) exp(βUh,t−1)∑H
h=1 exp(βUh,t−1)
, (10)
where the impact of the expectation heuristic h at period t depends on its accumulated
impact and its relative performance normalized with the sum of all competing heuristics.
There are two free parameters in (10). The first one, δ ∈ [0, 1], represents the proportion of
agents who do not update their heuristic each period, or the individual inertia in beliefs. The
second parameter, β > 0, represents agents’ sensitivity toward differences in performances.33
To compute expectations with HSM and compare fits, one must first determine which
32Their model inherits its main features from Brock and Hommes (1997).
33β = 0 would imply equal impacts regardless of the differences in performances.
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expectation heuristics to include, and then set their initial impacts as well as assign the values
to free parameters η, δ, β. Following a common practice in the literature, we consider four
different heuristics. We consider three classes of expectation rules – adaptive, extrapolative
and similarity-based – and, for each of them, choose the best-fitting specification (rules 3,
8, 15, respectively).34 We also include an equilibrium-based rule: fundamentalism (rule 14).
We assign the initial impact factors equal to nh,3 = 0.25 for all h and set the free parameters
to η = 0.1, δ = 0.4, β = 0.1. By trial and error, we discover that this combination of free
parameters fits the data best.35
The second heterogeneous expectation model we consider – MIXEXP – follows Haltiwanger
and Waldman (1985, 1989) and is based on the assumption that each group is composed of n
rational players and 5−n na¨ıve players. The main reason for including it in our comparison
is that it provides good descriptive fit to the experimental data in Cooper et al. (2017). Like
them, we consider a single rational player per group (n = 1). The remaining players make
na¨ıve forecasts according to the SBNE. In each round, the subject whose prediction error
in the first post-shock period is the smallest in a given group is considered as the rational
player in that group.36 The rational player forecasts consistently with RE:
pREi,t = p¯−i,t + i,t, (11)
where i,t ∼ N (0, 1).
Panel B in Table 6 reports RMSE for each of the heterogeneous expectation models.37
These results show that the HSM fits better than all the other rules, including MIXEXP,
at every data aggregation level. The improvement in fit compared to the best homogeneous
expectation rule ranges between 15% and 53% depending on the scale and equals 32% at
34Note that for the class of adaptive expectations, the best fitting rule is na¨ıve expectations (rule 1).
However, since SBNE (rule 15) is already a refined version of that rule, we include rule 3 instead.
35As a robustness check, in Appendix C.1 we provide RMSE obtained under various combinations of free
parameters. While the outcomes do vary in absolute terms, the relative standing of different rules for a given
period remains fairly stable.
36We are indebted to Michael Waldman for suggesting us this strategy.
37For the HSM, RMSE is computed for periods 4-64 where expectations are endogeneously determined.
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pooled level. Albeit not as well performing as the HSM, MIXEXP performs better than all
the homogeneous expectation rules which makes it the second-best expectation model in our
exercise.
Result 5: Models with heterogenous expectations better fit the data than those with
homogeneous expectations.
(a) Baseline (b) Treatment
Figure 3: Impact factors of the HSM across periods and experimental conditions. The symbols square,
cross, triangle and circle represent respectively adaptive expectations (v1), fundamentalist, SBNE and weak
trend-following expectations.
Finally, Figures 3a and 3b show the evolution of the impact factors of different heuristics
over time in the baseline and treatment conditions. Notwithstanding the claim of ”experience
eliminates naivety”, for both experimental conditions we find that SBNE attains the highest
average impact factor in the final round of the game.38 On the opposite extreme, fundamentalist
expectations attract very low weights during the first two rounds, but their role increases
toward the final round.
5 Discussion
The results outlined in Section 4.2 reveal that the refinement of expectation rules with
similarity-based learning improves their fit considerably when shocks are identical. Notably,
the SBNE rule performs well under both homogeneous and heterogeneous expectations.
38Table B3 in Appendix B reports the average of impact factors separately for pre-shock and post-shock
phases.
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Under this rule, a player expects the last period’s outcome to reoccur in stationary phases as
it is the case in na¨ıve expectations. In case of a change in the environment, this expectation
rule points to the outcome of the most recent period characterized by the same change. This
rule is consistent with the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) case-based decision theory and the
similarity-based learning model of Plonsky et al. (2015), both of which suggest that agents
choose the action which generated the best outcome under similar circumstances that an
agent can recall from the past. Thus, the SBNE rule can be viewed as a combination of
the similarity-based learning process with na¨ıve heuristic that is applied to the domain of
expectations formation.
This framework proposes a potential explanation for why the trend-following rule with
a strong extrapolation parameter fits the data well in LtFEs and poorly in guessing games
like ours. The main difference between LtFEs and guessing games is that while the LtFEs
inform subjects only qualitatively on the data generating process, guessing games provide
quantitative information by disclosing the target formula. If there are also unexpected large
shocks as in the LtFEs of Bao et al. (2012), the last period is less likely to be perceived
as the most similar state. A stronger extrapolation of recent changes may thus help detect
the arrival of a shock. This strong extrapolation also creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, since
it endogenously generates large oscillations around equilibrium. In guessing games, players
may judge the similarity with certainty so that there is less necessity for extrapolation. The
na¨ıve and weak trend-following rules therefore tend to perform better. For instance, this
may explain why a trend model with extrapolation factor 1 performs poorly in the AMEs of
Marquardt et al. (2019): weak trend-following and na¨ıve heuristics create slow convergence
toward NE, analogously to what we observe in our experiment.
Lastly, the results in the second part of Section 4.2 indicate that allowing heterogeneity
in expectations through the HSM or MIXEXP improves the fits substantially in line with
the evidence from the LtF literature. The evolution of impact factors computed through
HSM implies that there is more heterogeneity in nonidentical shocks condition. This pattern
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– if proves to be robust – suggests that the presence of real-world complications such as
nonidentical shocks may make coordination over an expectation rule more difficult.
6 Conclusion
We investigate the evolution of adjustment speed across repeated identical and nonidentical
shocks. We investigate whether adjustment accelerates over repetitions and whether this
acceleration varies across the different types of shocks. We find that adjustment accelerates
thanks to repetition, yet only slightly: despite four repetitions, convergence speeds up
by only two periods at best. Nonidentical shocks do not impact adjustment speed, and
adjustment acceleration remains weak regardless the type of shock. A descriptive analysis
of the expectation formation process reveals that the backward-looking rules organize the
data well. In particular, rules refined with similarity-based learning approach outperform
the others in terms of predictive power.
Our experiment successfully documents the robustness of the finding of Cooper et al.
(2017) from a guessing game with strategic complementarity: a gradual and convex adjustment
in response to identical shocks and its acceleration over repetition. This evidence strengthens
the empirical validity of the strategic environment effect, in line with an early conjecture
by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985). Furthermore, these patterns of learning to play
equilibrium under strategic complementarity persist in a more complex environment with
time-varying shocks. We fit a large set of expectation rules to provide an individual-based
explanation to the observed aggregate dynamics. The SBNE rule, a simple learning rule first
proposed by Cooper et al. (2017) and not yet studied in a comparative analysis, outperforms
other rules in terms of descriptive accuracy.
The main implication of these findings is that inertia in adjustment may rather persist
over time. The fact that the type of shock does not affect behavioral dynamics suggests that
sluggishness is an inherent feature of strategic complementarity. Importantly, our design also
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does not include any market frictions that are usually considered as the main drivers of sticky
behavior. This, in turn, suggests that cognitive frictions such as nonrational expectations
suffice to create stickiness, and potentially opens the door for policy implications. Although
an experimental testbed for policy instruments is beyond the scope of this study, we note
that monetary policy interventions may prove to be effective.39
Despite its virtues, our study may also have certain limitations. Here, we set the number
of shocks to four and one may claim that this is not enough for a major acceleration. While
this might be a limitation of experiments in general, we reckon that four rounds should be
sufficient for observing accelerated adjustment in a relatively simple environment like ours.
Another design choice is to rematch subjects in the beginning of each new round to control
for factors that are accumulating across rounds such as the degree of strategic uncertainty.
This random rematching mechanism might partially be the reason for limited acceleration
and it may stand at odds with certain real-world environments, such as asset markets.40
Lastly, we only look at negative shocks. Even though the sign of a shock should not matter
in guessing games, it may matter in a pricing context. We believe that varying the form of
the heterogeneity of shocks constitutes a possible agenda for future studies.
39Cornand and Heinemann (2019) show that in a New Keynesian framework, monetary policy obeying
the Taylor principle decreases the degree of complementarity between pricing decisions of firms and even
turns them into strategic substitutes if its effect on aggregate demand is sufficiently strong. In a similar vein,
Assenza et al. (2019) show through their New Keynesian LtFEs that the Taylor principle with sufficiently
strong interest rate rule (ξpi = 1.5 in their experiment) manages convergence to the forward stable solution.
40Cooper et al. (2017) test this argument in an auxiliary treatment and find that the main results are
qualitatively unchanged. In the light of this result, the question of matching scheme should be less of a
concern.
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Appendices
A Experimental Material
A.1 Instructions and Comprehension Questions in Original Language
Instructions Ge´ne´rales
L’expe´rience comprend 4 tours et chaque tour comprend 16 pe´riodes, soit un total
de 64 pe´riodes. Au de´but de l’expe´rience, vous serez assigne´s au hasard en groupes de
cinq. Vous n’interagirez qu’avec les autres joueurs de votre groupe. Au de´but de chaque
nouveau tour, les groupes seront reconstitue´s de fac¸on ale´atoire. Cela signifie que vous
jouerez au sein du meˆme groupe pendant un tour, et que la composition de votre groupe
variera ale´atoirement d’un tour a` l’autre.
Votre Taˆche
Au de´but de chaque pe´riode, il sera demande´ a` chaque participant de choisir un nombre
entre 0 et 100, inclus. Ce nombre peut comporter jusqu’a` deux de´cimales, par exemple 11.35
ou 95.23. Aucun participant ne pourra voir le nombre choisi par un autre participant.
A` chaque pe´riode, chaque joueur a un ”Nombre cible”. A` la fin de chaque pe´riode, le
joueur de votre groupe dont le nombre choisi est le plus proche de son nombre cible
remportera le gain de 4.40 euros pour cette pe´riode. Les autres joueurs gagneront 0 euro
pour cette pe´riode. Si plusieurs joueurs se trouvent a` la meˆme distance de leur nombre cible,
le gain de 4.40 euros est divise´ a` part e´gales entre ces joueurs, tandis que les autres gagnent
0 euro.
Le nombre cible de chaque joueur est calcule´ a` l’aide de la formule suivante :
Nombre cible = 0.75 × (moyenne des nombres choisis par les autres joueurs de votre
groupe) + une constante
Ici, ”la moyenne des nombres choisis par les autres joueurs de votre groupe” est e´gale a` la
somme des nombres choisis par les autres joueurs de votre groupe divise´ par quatre. Cette
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moyenne est calcule´e de la meˆme fac¸on pour tous les participants a` l’expe´rience. Tous les
participants seront informe´s sur la constante par le biais de leur e´cran de de´cision. Cette
constante est la meˆme pour tous les participants mais peut changer au cours de l’expe´rience.
Lorsqu’un changement survient, ce changement est annonce´ a` tous les participants a` l’e´cran.
Veuillez ve´rifier la formule a` chaque pe´riode.
E´cran de De´cision
La formule du Nombre cible vous est indique´e a` l’e´cran. Sur cet e´cran, vous pouvez entrer
votre de´cision dans une cellule. Lorsque vous cliquez sur le bouton ”OK”, le programme vous
montre la ”Moyenne des nombres choisis par les autres joueurs de votre groupe” pour laquelle
votre de´cision correspondrait au nombre cible. Apre`s avoir vu cette information, vous pouvez
modifier votre de´cision autant de fois que vous le souhaitez. Une fois que vous avez clique´
sur ”Confirmer” votre de´cision pour cette pe´riode sera de´finitive.
Notez qu’il y a une limite de temps pour les de´cisions a` chaque pe´riode et vous pouvez
suivre le temps restant sur votre e´cran. Vous aurez 120 secondes pour votre premie`re de´cision
et 60 secondes pour les de´cisions de toutes les pe´riodes restantes. Un tableau et une figure
vous permettent e´galement de suivre vos de´cisions pre´ce´dentes et la de´cision moyenne
pre´ce´dente des autres joueurs de votre groupe.
Paiement
A la fin de l’expe´rience, l’ordinateur se´lectionnera au hasard l’un des tours joue´s, et votre
paiement final sera base´ sur les gains que vous avez accumule´s au cours de ce tour, plus 5 +
2 = 7 euros pour la participation et le questionnaire auquel vous venez de re´pondre.
Questionnaire de Compre´hension
Vous allez maintenant re´pondre a` un questionnaire de compre´hension des re`gles du jeu.
Un bouton se situant au milieu de l’e´cran vous permettra d’acce´der a` une calculatrice lorsque
vous en aurez besoin.
True of False Questions:
Question 1: Il y a 4 autres joueurs dans mon groupe.
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Question 2: Je joue avec le meˆme groupe de joueurs pendant toute l’expe´rience.
Question 3: La formule pour le nombre cible peut changer au cours de l’expe´rience.
Question 4: Tous les joueurs ont leur propre formule pour le nombre cible.
Question 5: Je serai paye´ en fonction de mes gains accumule´s au cours d’un tour choisi
au hasard.
Questions Based on an Example:
Imaginez que la formule pour le nombre cible soit e´gale a`
Nombre cible = 0.75 × ( Moyenne des nombres choisis par les autres joueurs ) + 15
Question 6: Si les autres joueurs dans le groupe ont choisi 10, 30, 35, 85 comme de´cisions
pour le nombre cible, quel est selon vous la ”Moyenne des nombres choisis par les autres
joueurs de votre groupe” ?
Question 7: A` quoi votre nombre cible serait-il e´gal dans cette situation?
Question 8: Imaginez que vous avez choisi le nombre 55 comme de´cision pour cette
pe´riode. Quelle est la distance entre le nombre cible et votre de´cision?
Question 9: Dans cet exemple, les distances entre les nombres choisis et les nombres
cibles pour les autres joueurs sont respectivement: 47.18, 17.5, 0.31 et 41.87.
Dans cet exemple, eˆtes-vous le gagnant?
Answers and Explanations Provided to Subjects:
Question 1: Vrai.
Explication: Il y a 5 joueurs dans chaque groupe et 4 autres quand vous eˆtes exclu.
Question 2: Faux.
Explication: Au de´but de chaque nouveau tour (17e`me, 33e`me et 49e`me pe´riodes), les
groupes seront reconstitue´s d’une manie`re ale´atoire. Cela signifie que vous jouerez au sein du
meˆme groupe pendant un tour, et que la composition de votre groupe variera ale´atoirement
d’un tour a` l’autre.
Question 3: Vrai.
Explication: La formule pour le nombre cible peut changer. Veuillez preˆter attention au
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de´but de chaque pe´riode.
Question 4: Faux.
Explication: La formule pour le nombre cible pour une pe´riode donne´e est la meˆme pour
tous les joueurs.
Question 5: Vrai.
Explication: A` la fin de l’expe´rience, un tour parmi 4 sera se´lectionne´ au hasard et vous
obtiendrez vos gains cumule´s pour ce tour.
Question 6: 40.
Explication: La re´ponse correcte est 40. C’est la moyenne des autres joueurs du groupe,
soit dans cet exemple : (10+30+35+85)/4 = 40.
Question 7: 45.
Explication: La re´ponse correcte est 45. Le nombre cible est calcule´ avec la formule pour
le nombre cible, soit dans exemple : 0.75 x 40 + 15 = 45.
Question 8: 10.
Explication: La re´ponse correcte est 10. Le nombre cible est 45 et vous avez choisi 55.
La distance entre ces deux nombres est e´gale a` 10.
Question 9: Non.
Explication: Votre distance (10) n’est pas la plus petite. 0.31 est la plus petite distance
dans ce groupe.
A.2 Instructions and Comprehension Questions Translated to English
General Instructions
The experiment has 4 rounds and each round has 16 periods, a total of 64 periods.
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned in groups of five. You
will only interact with other players in your group. At the beginning of each new round, the
groups will be reconstituted in a random manner. This means that you will play in the same
group during a round, and that the composition of your group will vary randomly from one
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round to another.
Your Task
At the beginning of each period, each participant will be asked to choose a number
between 0 and 100, inclusive. This number can be up to two decimals, such as 11.35 or
95.23. No participant will be able to see the number chosen by another participant.
In each period, each player has a ”Target Number”. At the end of each period, the player
in your group whose chosen number is closest to his or her target number will win
the prize of 4.40 Euros for that period. The other players will earn 0 euro for this period. If
several players have the same distance from their target number, the prize of 4.40 euros will
be divided equally between these players, while the others would win 0 euros.
The target number of each player is calculated using the following formula:
Target number = 0.75 × (average of the numbers chosen by the other players in your
group) + a constant
Here, ”the average of the numbers chosen by the other players in your group” is equal
to the sum of the numbers chosen by the other players in your group divided by four. This
average is calculated in the same way for all participants in the experiment. All participants
will be informed about the constant through their decision screen. This constant is the
same for all participants but may change during the experience. When a change occurs, this
change will be announced to all participants on their screen. Please check the formula for
each period.
Decision Screen
The target number formula is going to be shown on the screen. On this screen, you
can enter your decision in a cell. When you click on the ”OK” button, the program will
show you the ”Average of the numbers chosen by the other players in your group” for which
your guessing decision corresponds to. After seeing this information, you can change your
decision as many times as you want. Once you click on ”Confirm” button your decision for
this period will be final.
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Note that there is limited time for decisions in each period and you can track the
remaining time on your screen. You will have 120 seconds for your first decision and 60
seconds for each decisions of the remaining periods. A table and a figure also allow you
to follow your previous decisions and the previous average decision of the other
players in your group.
Payment
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the rounds played,
and your final payment will be based on the payoffs that you have accumulated during this
round, plus 5 + 2 = 7 euros for participation and the questionnaire you answered.
Comprehension Questions
You will now answer several questions designed to check whether you understood the rules
of the game. The button in the middle of the screen will allow you to access a calculator
when you need it.
True of False Questions:
Question 1: There are 4 other players in my group.
Question 2: I play with the same group of players throughout the experience.
Question 3: The formula for the target number may change during the experiment.
Question 4: All players have their own formula for the target number.
Question 5: I will be paid based on my accumulated winnings during a randomly chosen
round.
Questions Based on an Example:
Imagine that the formula for the target number is equal to
Target number = 0.75 × (Average of the numbers chosen by the other players) + 15
Question 6: If the other players in the group chose 10, 30, 35, 85 as decisions for the
target number, what do you think is the ”Average of the numbers chosen by the other players
in your group”?
Question 7: What would your target number be equal to in this situation?
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Question 8: Imagine that you chose number 55 as the decision for this period. What is
the distance between the target number and your decision?
Question 9: In this example, the distances between the chosen numbers and the target
numbers for the other players are respectively: 47.18, 17.5, 0.31 and 41.87.
In this example, are you the winner?
Answers and Explanations Provided to the Subjects:
Question 1: True.
Explanation: There are 5 players in each group and 4 others when you are excluded.
Question 2: False.
Explanation: At the beginning of each new round (17th, 33rd and 49th periods), the
groups will be reconstituted in a random manner. This means that you will play with same
group members during a round, and that the composition of your group will vary from round
to round.
Question 3: True.
Explanation: The formula for the target number may change. Please pay attention in
each period.
Question 4: False.
Explanation: The formula for the target number for a given period is the same for all
players.
Question 5: True.
Explanation: At the end of the experiment, one of the four rounds will be randomly
selected and you will get your winnings that are accumulated during this round.
Question 6: 40.
Explanation: The correct answer is 40. This is the average number of the other players
in the group, in this example: (10 + 30 + 35 + 85) / 4 = 40.
Question 7: 45.
Explanation: The correct answer is 45. The target number is calculated using the formula
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for the target number: 0.75 x 40 + 15 = 45.
Question 8: 10.
Explanation: The correct answer is 10. The target number is 45 and you have chosen 55.
The distance between these two numbers is 10.
Question 9: No.
Explanation: Your distance (10) is not the smallest. 0.31 is the smallest distance in this
group.
A.3 Experimental Interface
Figure 4: An (arbitrary) example for the decision screen that subjects used to enter their
guess
Subject first had to enter their guess decision in the box on the upper left panel of
decision screen and see their expectation that this guess corresponds to on the upper right
panel. Once they click on ”Confirmer”, their decision becomes irreversible. For the codes
and the translation of the material into English, contact one of the authors.
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Figure 5: An (arbitrary) example for the feedback screen that subjects used to see the results
of the period
A.4 Tests in Original Language
Note that subjects solve these tests before the main part of the experiment. So, instructions
presented here are the initial instructions that subjects see.
Initial Instructions
Bienvenue!
Vous allez participer a` une expe´rience e´conomique. Pendant cette expe´rience, vous n’eˆtes
pas autorise´ a` communiquer avec les autres participants. Si vous avez un te´le´phone portable,
veuillez l’e´teindre. Si vous avez une question, appuyez sur le bouton rouge a` votre gauche ou
levez la main, l’expe´rimentateur viendra vous voir; ne posez pas votre question a` voix haute.
Si la question est pertinente pour tous les participants, nous la re´pe´terons et y re´pondrons
a` voix haute. Si vous ne respectez pas ces re`gles, nous devrons vous exclure de l’expe´rience
et donc du paiement.
Toutes les informations que vous fournissez, ainsi que le montant de vos gains lors de
cette expe´rience, resteront strictement confidentielles et anonymes. La participation a` cette
expe´rience vous fera gagner de l’argent. Vos gains vous seront verse´s en espe`ces de manie`re
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prive´e a` la fin de l’expe´rience. Vous gagnez 5 euros pour vous pre´senter a` temps, 2 euros
pour re´pondre a` une se´rie de questions et un montant supple´mentaire qui varie entre 0 et
70 euros. Le paiement supple´mentaire de´pendra de vos de´cisions et peut e´galement eˆtre
influence´ par les de´cisions prises par les autres.
Tout d’abord, avant de commencer l’expe´rience a` proprement parler, nous vous demandons
de re´pondre a` une se´rie de questions pre´liminaires. Vous re´pondrez a` ces questions a` l’aide
de l’interface sur votre e´cran d’ordinateur.
CRT Questions
1) Un carnet et un crayon couˆtent 1,10 Euros. Le carnet couˆte 1 Euro de plus que le
crayon. Combien de centimes couˆte le crayon ? (correct answer: 0.05 cents)
2) En supposant qu’il faut 5 minutes a` 5 machines pour fabriquer 5 stylos, combien de
temps faudrait-il a` 100 machines pour fabriquer 100 stylos? (correct answer: 5)
3) Sur un e´tang pousse un banc de ne´nuphars. La taille du banc double chauqe jour.
En supposant qu’il faille 48 jours pour que le banc recouvre tout l’e´tang, combien de temps
faudrait-il pour que le banc recouvre la moitie´ de l’e´tang? (correct answer:47)
Representativeness Heuristic Questions
Veuillez lire les descriptions ci-dessous et re´pondre aux questions.
Description 1: Linda a 31 ans, elle est ce´libataire, franche et tre`s brillante. Elle posse`de
une maˆıtrise de philosophie. E´tudiante, elle se montrait tre`s pre´occupe´e par les questions de
discrimination et de justice sociale, elle participait aussi a` des manifestations antinucle´aires.
Veuillez classer les e´nonce´s suivants en fonction de leur probabilite´, en utilisant 1 pour le
plus probable et 7 pour le moins probable :
1) Linda est enseignante a` l’e´cole primaire.
2) Linda travaille dans une librairie et prend des cours de yoga.
3) Linda est active dans le mouvement fe´ministe.
4) Linda est guichetie`re dans une banque.
5) Linda est assistante sociale en milieu psychiatrique.
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6) Linda est vendeuse d’assurances.
7) Linda est guichetie`re dans une banque et est active dans le mouvement fe´ministe.
Correct answer: If option 7 is judged more probable than option 3 and 4, then the answer
is correct.
Description 2: Une certaine ville est desservie par deux hoˆpitaux. Environ 45 be´be´s
naissent chaque jour dans le grand hoˆpital et environ 15 be´be´s naissent chaque jour dans le
petit hoˆpital. Comme vous le savez, environ 50% des be´be´s sont des garc¸ons. Le pourcentage
exact de be´be´s garc¸ons varie toutefois d’un jour a` l’autre. Parfois, il peut eˆtre supe´rieur a`
50%, parfois infe´rieur.
Pendant une pe´riode d’un an, chaque hoˆpital a enregistre´ les jours ou` plus de 60% des
be´be´s ne´s e´taient des garc¸ons. Selon vous, dans quel hoˆpital le nombre de tels jours e´tait-il
le plus e´leve´?
A) Le grand hoˆpital
B) Le petit hoˆpital
C) Pareil pour les deux hoˆpitaux.
Correct answer: Option B is the correct answer.
Availability Heuristic Questions
Ci-dessous, chaque e´le´ment comprend deux causes possibles de de´ce`s. La question a`
laquelle vous devez re´pondre est la suivante : parmi les deux causes possibles de de´ce`s,
quelle est la plus fre´quente, en ge´ne´ral, en France ? Pour chaque paire de causes possibles
de de´ce`s, (a) et (b), nous souhaitons que vous choisissiez la cause qui vous semble la plus
fre´quente.
Paire 1 (a) Accidents de la route (b) Diabe`te (correct answer: b)
Paire 2 (a) Homicide (b) Suicide (correct answer: b)
Paire 3 (a) Accident vasculaire ce´re´bral (AVC) (b) Tous les accidents (correct answer: a)
Paire 4 (a) Des chutes (b) L’usage de drogues (correct answer: a )
Paire 5 (a) Foudroiement (b) Empoisonnement (correct answer: b)
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Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
Vous allez voir maintenant une se´rie d’images pre´sentant des paires d’yeux, ainsi que 4
mots. Pour chaque paire d’yeux, choisissez le mot qui de´crit le mieux ce que la personne sur
l’image pense ou ressent. Vous pouvez estimer que plusieurs mots peuvent s’appliquer mais
ne choisissez que le mot que vous conside´rez le plus approprie´. Avant de faire votre choix,
assurez-vous que vous avez bien lu les 4 propositions.
Il y aura au total 36 questions auxquelles vous devrez re´pondre dans un de´lai de 10
minutes. Essayez de re´pondre aussi rapidement et pre´cise´ment que possible. Pour re´pondre,
se´lectionnez l’un des choix affiche´s sous l’image puis cliquez sur OK en bas. Veuillez noter
qu’une fois que vous aurez clique´ sur OK, vous ne pourrez pas revenir aux questions pre´ce´dentes.
Cliquez sur OK pour passer a` la question d’essai.
Training question:
Options: 1: jaloux, 2: panique´, 3: arrogant, 4: haineux
Correct answer and explanations:
Parmi les choix : ”jaloux”, ”panique´”, ”arrogant”, ”haineux”, la bonne re´ponse e´tait :
”panique´”. Cliquez sur OK pour commencer les autres questions. A partir de maintenant,
les bonnes re´ponses ne seront plus montre´es.
Pour rappel, il y aura au total 36 questions auxquelles vous devrez re´pondre dans un
de´lai de 10 minutes. Essayez de re´pondre aussi rapidement et pre´cise´ment que possible.
Short Term Memory Test
Vous allez maintenant regarder plusieurs se´ries des diapositives. Au de´but de chaque
se´rie, vous verrez le mot ”Preˆt ?” puis une se´quence des nume´ros s’affichant les uns apre`s les
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autres. A la fin de chaque se´rie, vous entrerez dans la zone de saisie la se´quence de nombres
que vous aurez observe´e.
Les se´quences seront de plus en plus longues a` mesure que vous entrez des re´ponses
correctes. Votre objectif est d’aller le plus loin possible. Vous aurez deux essais. Par
exemple, si dans une se´rie vous voyez 1, puis 3 et puis 5, vous devez entrer 135.
First sequence: 69, 929, 1021, 34634, 943453, 7374865, 69358267, 690875725, 6457803021,
26456897198, 601518340985, 1285246589042.
Second sequence: 25, 217, 8618, 48629, 727240, 1203439, 32904142, 750572970, 1720378975,
62617825067, 609295956490, 1678606889148.
A.5 Tests Translated to English
Note that subjects solve these tests before the main part of the experiment. So, instructions
presented here are the initial instructions that subjects see.
Initial Instructions
Welcome!
You will participate in an economic experiment. During this experiment, you are not
allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a cell phone, please turn it off.
If you have a question, press the red button on your left or raise your hand, the experimenter
will come to see you; don’t ask your question out loud. If the question is relevant to all
participants, we will repeat it and answer it out loud. If you do not respect these rules, we
will have to exclude you from the experiment and therefore from the payment.
All the information you provide, as well as the amount of your payoffs during this
experiment, will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. Participating in this experiment
will gain you money. Your winnings will be paid to you privately at the end of the experiment.
You earn 5 euros for showing up on time, 2 euros for answering a series of questions and an
additional amount that varies between 0 and 70 euros. The additional payment depend on
your decisions and may also be influenced by decisions made by others.
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First of all, before starting the actual experiment, we ask you to answer a series of
preliminary questions. You will answer these questions using the interface on your computer
screen.
CRT Questions
1) A notebook and a pencil cost 1.10 Euros. The notebook costs 1 Euro more than the
pencil. How many cents does the pencil cost? (correct answer: 0.05 cents)
2) Assuming that 5 machines take 5 minutes to make 5 pens, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 pens? (correct answer: 5)
3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake? (correct answer:47)
Representativeness Heuristic Questions
Please read the descriptions below and answer the questions.
Description 1: Linda is 31 years old, she is single, frank and very bright. She has
a master’s degree in philosophy. As a student, she was very concerned about issues of
discrimination and social justice, she also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Please rank the following statements based on their likelihood, using 1 for the most likely
and 7 for the least likely:
1) Linda is a primary school teacher.
2) Linda works in a bookstore and takes yoga classes.
3) Linda is active in the feminist movement.
4) Linda is a bank teller.
5) Linda is a social worker in a psychiatric environment.
6) Linda is an insurance salesperson.
7) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
Correct answer: If option 7 is judged more probable than options 3 and 4, then the
answer is correct.
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Description 2: A certain city is served by two hospitals. About 45 babies are born every
day in the big hospital and about 15 babies are born every day in the small hospital. As you
know, about 50% of new born babies are boys. The exact percentage of baby boys, however,
varies from day to day. Sometimes it can be more than 50%, sometimes less.
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days when more than 60% of the
babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think had the highest number of such days?
A) The big hospital
B) The small hospital
C) Same for the two hospitals.
Correct answer: Option B is the correct answer.
Availability Heuristic Questions
Below, each item includes two possible causes of death. The question to which you must
answer is the following: among the two possible causes of death, which is the most frequent,
in general, in France? For each pair of possible causes of death, (a) and (b), we want you to
choose the cause that you think is the most common.
Pair 1 (a) Road accidents (b) Diabetes (correct answer: b)
Pair 2 (a) Homicide (b) Suicide (correct answer: b)
Pair 3 (a) Stroke (b) All accidents (correct answer: a)
Pair 4 (a) Falls (b) Drug use (correct answer: a)
Pair 5 (a) Lightning strike (b) Poisoning (correct answer: b)
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
You will now see a series of images presenting pairs of eyes, as well as 4 words. For each
pair of eyes, choose the word that best describes what the person in the image thinks or
feels. You may feel that more than one word may apply, but choose only the word that you
consider most appropriate. Before making your choice, make sure that you have read the 4
propositions correctly.
There will be a total of 36 questions to be answered within 10 minutes. Try to respond
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as quickly and accurately as possible. To respond, select one of the choices displayed below
the image and click OK at the bottom. Please note that once you click OK, you will not be
able to return to the previous questions.
Click OK to proceed to the test question.
Training question:
Options: 1: jealous, 2: panicked, 3: arrogant, 4: hateful
Correct answer and explanations:
Among the choices: ”jealous”, ”panicked”, ”arrogant”, ”hateful”, the correct answer was:
”panicked”. Click OK to start the other questions. From now on, correct answers will no
longer be shown.
As a reminder, there will be a total of 36 questions which you will have to answer within
10 minutes. Try to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.
Short Term Memory Test
You will now look at several sets of slides. At the start of each series, you will see the
word ”Ready?” then a sequence of numbers appearing one after the other. At the end of
each series, you will enter in the input zone the sequence of numbers that you will have
observed.
The sequences will become longer as you enter correct answers. Your goal is to go as far
as possible. You will have two tries. For example, if in a series you see 1, then 3 and then
5, you would enter 135.
First sequence: 69, 929, 1021, 34634, 943453, 7374865, 69358267, 690875725, 6457803021,
26456897198, 601518340985, 1285246589042.
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Second sequence: 25, 217, 8618, 48629, 727240, 1203439, 32904142, 750572970, 1720378975,
62617825067, 609295956490, 1678606889148.
A.6 Score Measurement, Procedures and References for Tests
The cognitive reflection task is retrieved from Frederick (2005) and adapted to French.
Each correct answer is considered as one point in the score calculation. There is a nonbinding
time limitation which is 30 seconds for this part.
The heuristic questions are retrieved and adapted to the French population from the
studies of Kahneman and Tversky (1972), Tversky and Kahneman (1973) and Fischhoff et al.
(1977). The correct answers are determined from the data of World Health Organization’s
(WHO) report on global health estimates between 2000-2016 (World Health Organization,
2018). Each wrong answer is considered as one point in the score calculation.
The French version of The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is retrieved from Prevost
et al. (2014). Each correct answer is considered as one point in the score calculation. There
is a binding time limitation which is 10 minutes for this part.
The short-term memory test is retrieved from Wechsler digit span test. The score is
calculated as the maximum of the number of digits accurately remembered in both sequences.
Each number stays in the screen for 2 seconds and the box where subjects type the number
appears with 2 seconds delay after the last number.
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B Additional Figures and Tables
Table B1 - Descriptive statistics of the sample
Pooled Baseline Treatment
Age 21.43 21.83 21.03
(1.91) (2.32) (1.26)
Share of women 42% 38% 47%
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Baccalaureate grade 15.97 15.76 16.18
(2.03) (1.99) (2.04)
CRT score 1.49 1.4 1.58
(1.14) (1.07) (1.20)
Eyes score 27.2 26.97 27.43
(3.92) (4.30) (3.48)
Memory score 7.05 7.02 7.08
(1.67) (1.95) (1.33)
Represent. score 1.29 1.30 1.28
(0.65) (0.64) (0.66)
Availability score 2.13 2.00 2.27
(1.02) (1.05) (0.98)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table B2 - Improvements from similarity
Refinement in the initial post-shock period
Baseline Treatment
Periods 25 41 57 57
∆SBNE -0.117 0.383 0.682 0.286
∆SBTF -0.363 0.152 0.451 0.210
∆SBAE 0.000 0.502 0.723 0.335
Note: Each row reports the percent change in RMSE
when the SBNE, SBTF or SBAE rules are taken instead
of their non-refined equivalents. The columns correspond
to the data from the intial post-shock periods (one per
round)
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Table B3 - Average of impact factors in the HSM
Panel A - Average impact factors of pre-shock phases
Baseline Treatment
Rounds Rule 15 Rule 3 Rule 8 Rule 14 Rule 15 Rule 3 Rule 8 Rule 14
1 0.31 0.37 0.28 0.03 0.32 0.34 0.30 0.04
2 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.09
3 0.47 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.29 0.26 0.31 0.14
4 0.42 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.35
Panel B - Average impact factors of post-shock phases
Baseline Treatment
Rounds Rule 15 Rule 3 Rule 8 Rule 14 Rule 15 Rule 3 Rule 8 Rule 14
1 0.33 0.36 0.30 0.00 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.00
2 0.34 0.29 0.31 0.06 0.27 0.24 0.35 0.13
3 0.45 0.22 0.27 0.06 0.31 0.22 0.43 0.03
4 0.37 0.15 0.32 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.34 0.13
Note: Each value in panel A and B represents the average impact factors computed for the HSM
described in Section 4.2 for pre-shock or post-shock phases. The pre-shock phase of first round
includes periods 4 to 8.
Figure 6: Distribution of individual guesses across periods. 120 subjects per period. Plus signs (cross
signs) represent baseline (treatment) conditions.
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Figure 7: Average guess of clusters by periods. The identification number of clusters are denoted above
each figure. Clusters 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12 belong to baseline sessions and clusters 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10 belong to
treatment sessions.
C Robustness Analyses
C.1 Calibration of Free Parameters in HSM
The HSM has three free parameters where each has its own behavioral implication. To
avoid arbitrariness, we provide a robustness analysis by comparing our benchmark HSM,
denoted as HSM 1, with the benchmark HSM of Bao et al. (2012), denoted as HSM 4.
For analytical tractability, we add two other versions of HSM where in each step one free
paramater gets closer to the one in Bao et al. (2012). Table C1 reports the results and
Figure 8 projects the impact factors as time series. Results show that the fit worsens when
any of the parameter increases ceteris paribus and the RMSE of HSM 4 is almost equal to
the best homogeneous expectation rule. Nonetheless, the fits of HSM 2 and 3 are better
than any of the homogeneous rule. Step-wise changes imply that the HSM applied to our
data is not much sensitive to changes in parameters η and β but it is somehow sensitive to
the abrupt changes in δ, at least for the treatment condition. This parameter represents
the proportion of agents who do not update their impact factor each period and a value of
0.9 is behaviorally hard to justify. In conclusion, our benchmark results are robust to the
medium-level changes in parameters.
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Table C1 - RMSE of HSM under different values of free parameters
Comparison Level HSM 1 HSM 2 HSM 3 HSM 4
Baseline 3.90 4.43 4.54 5.10
Treatment 4.08 5.68 5.68 6.46
Pool 3.99 5.09 5.14 5.82
η 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7
δ 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
β 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
Note: HSM 1 is equivalent to our benchmark HSM reported in Table 6. HSM 4 has
the benchmark parameters combination from Bao et al. (2012) and HSM 2 and 3
provide an intermediate change in parameters.
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(a) Baseline - HSM 2 (b) Treatment - HSM 2
(c) Baseline - HSM 3 (d) Treatment - HSM 3
(e) Baseline - HSM 4 (f) Treatment - HSM 4
Figure 8: Impact factors calculated with the HSM 2, 3, 4 across periods and experimental conditions.
Square, cross, triangle and dot represent adaptive expectations (v1), fundamentalist, SBNE and weak
trend-following expectations, respectively.
49
C.2 Cognitive Skills and Individual Expectations
In this Appendix section, we ask whether individual scores on cognitive skills tests predict
the accuracy of expectations and the best fitting expectation rule. For this sake, we compute
the average relative prediction error (ARPE) in a given round
1
16
T=16∑
t=1
|pei,t − p¯−i,t|
p¯−i,t
, (12)
as well as the goodness of fit of the different expectation models per subject, as measured
through RMSE. We then regress each of these measures on the set of subjects’ test scores.
These test scores are designed to measure some of the cognitive skills of subjects. Baccalaureate
grade is the score that subjects obtained upon completion of their secondary education. The
CRT score is computed through three items and is designed to measure one’s ability to reflect
on a question and override reporting the gut response. The RMET score is computed through
thirty-six items and is designed to measure one’s capacity to infer the internal emotional
states of others. Memory task is designed to measure one’s short-term memory capacity
through the number of items that one can remember with the correct order after seeing
a sequence of numbers. The representativeness (availability) score is computed through
two (five) items and designed to measure one’s propensity for reasoning according to the
representativeness (availability) heuristic.
All test scores are standardized as Scorei−min(Score)
max(Score)−min(Score) . Round and treatment dummies,
as well as their interactions, are also included in the model. We use a random effects
specification (N = 480 per regression).
Tables C2 and C3 report the corresponding estimates. Overall, the included test scores
only weakly explain the variation in either measure of interest. A higher RMET score
predicts a lower forecast error and a better fit for the fundamentalist rule. By contrast, in
groups where subjects are more prone to representativeness heuristic, Nash play is less likely
to occur.
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The round dummies are systematically found to explain the dependent variables. Compared
to round 1, in round 4 the values of ARPE drop and the fits of all the compared rules improve.
Note that even with this improvement, the fundamentalist rule still performs worse than
the other rules. The treatment dummy has no significant impact on any variable, but its
interaction with round 4 worsens the fit of all the rules. So, the improvement in the goodness
of fit over time is attenuated under nonindentical shocks. The coefficient of this interaction
term is also positive for ARPE (in line with Hypothesis 2), but not statistically significant.
51
Table C2 - RMSE of expectation rules and individual characteristics
Variables SBNE SBAE SBTF Fundamentalism
Intercept 10.52*** 10.37*** 11.42*** 19.14***
(3.36) (3.13) (3.39) (2.83)
Treatment -0.75 -0.58 -0.81 0.24
(1.42) (1.41) (1.55) (1.62)
Round 2 0.74 0.52 0.81 -2.26***
(1.19) (1.22) (1.26) (0.99)
Round 3 -1.69 -1.95* -1.37 -4.38***
(1.14) (1.13) (1.23) (0.95)
Round 4 -3.67*** -3.81*** -3.43*** -8.05***
(1.28) (1.202) (1.38) (0.87)
Round 2 × Treatment -0.18 -0.06 -0.16 -2.98**
(1.31) (1.34) (1.38) (1.16)
Round 3 × Treatment 2.28 2.51 1.74 4.38**
(1.55) (1.54) (1.62) (1.71)
Round 4 × Treatment 6.47*** 6.43*** 6.25*** 3.24***
(1.40) (1.34) (1.48) (1.24)
Baccalaureate grade 2.99** 2.66** 2.66** 2.35*
(1.22) (1.24) (1.11) (1.32)
CRT score -1.53 -1.54* -1.65* -0.81
(0.95) (0.88) (0.97) (0.74)
RMET score -2.56 -1.88 -3.05 -5.41***
(1.94) (1.73) (1.97) (1.99)
Memory score -2.95 -2.43 -3.13 -2.55
(3.44) (3.33) (3.51) (3.52)
Represent. score 0.81 0.61 1.16 2.89***
(1.23) (1.15) (1.24) (0.89)
Availability score -0.75 -0.56 -0.93 -0.49
(2.07) (1.95) (1.99) (1.36)
R2 overall 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.22
Note: Coefficients from random effect regression models. The dependent variables are the
RMSE of four expectation rules per subject computed for each round (N = 480 per regression).
The independent variables are standardized test scores, round and treatment dummy variables
and their interactions. Robust standard errors clustered at the rematching cluster level (12
clusters per condition) are reported. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1%
level, respectively.
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